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Almost 20 years ago, B. F. Skinner (1987) asked why we were not acting to save the world. His answer was that the cultural practices of most of the hu man race did not include the verbal be havior required to properly analyze the problems and plan the changes in the environment needed to promote cultur al (and possibly species) survival. The missing verbal cultural practice, Skin ner suggested, was the language of the experimental analysis of behavior specifically, the practice of analyzing the contingencies of reinforcement that support the behavior of members of a culture and predict the results of changing those contingencies. He fur ther suggested that the experimental analysis of behavior would support a theory of cultural evolution in the same way that Darwin's theory of biological evolution is supported by the experi mental science of genetics. Skinner's (1987) analogy offers a starting point for exploring in this pa per at least one way of using the lan guage of the experimental analysis of behavior to support an interpretive the ory of culture. Although Skinner's ul timate interest was in bringing about changes that would improve the lives of people, the point of his paper was that the path to effective action begins with effective verbal practices. In . 2004, the 100th anniversary of his birth, humans need more than ever a language that will help them to analyze their problems in ways that guide ef fective action. In the sections below, I review the principle of operant selection and the role of human social environments in behavioral contingencies. I then define culture and cultural practices and con sider the role of operant behavior in them. Two types of cultural-level re lations-macrocontingencies and me tacontinge11 ('ies-are distinguished, and the role of behavioral contingen cies in each type is explained as a pre l~de to accomplishing social change. Finally, I return to Skinner's views on the relation between the verbal practic es of the experimental analysis of be havior and a theoretical interpretation of culture.
THE PRINCIPLE OF OPERANT SELECTION
Behavioral principles describe the relations between behavior and envi ronment that account for the acquisi tion and maintenance of learned behav ior. The principle of operant selection is the bedrock on which other behav ioral principles rest. Like other scien tific principles, its simple form masks the complexity of the universe it de scribes. The principle of operant selec tion is sometimes stated as "behavior is a function of its consequences." Such a bald statement makes no men t~on ?f the different roles played by time in the selection process described by the principle. The statement also obscures the fact that the words behav ior and its, which appear to refer to the same thing, actually refer to different things. Let us unpack the statement in order to lay the groundwork for a sim ilar unpacking of cultural selection. Figure I is a schematic of operant se lection as it goes on in time."
The schematic shows, first, that the universe in which behavioral selection occurs is localized in the actions and events outside those actions (environ ment) of a single organism (let us say a young child learning to stack blocks). Of.course, we would not be particular ly interested in this universe if operant selection affected only this orzanism's 0 behavior. As it turns out, the process appeared early enough in the evolu tionary history of the earth to predate humans by millions of years and there fore is a behavioral characteristic
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shared by many species, perhaps hu mans most significantly. In the schematic, three types of events are shown to be occurring in re lation to one another in local I irne. One. type of event comprises the actions of Person P, whose responses are desig nated by the letter R followed hy a number. Each numbered R is a differ ent way of manipulating a block. To make the example as simple as possi ble, all Rs occur during a l-rnin period in a stable Situation S, which is present when each R occurs (blocks arc on a flat surface and everything in the play room remains constant). In that situa tion, the actions that an observer iden tifies as RI (e.g., placing a block squarely on top of another) are reliably followed by a particular type of stim ulus change, CI (a tower appears). That consequence does not follow the other actions occurring in Situation S. Situation S and the consequences rep resented by Clare environmental var iables.
The local temporal arrangements be tween each occurrence of R 1 and the subsequent CI in Situation S are shown in the diagonal arrangements of those letters. The recurring temporal relation between instances of RI (but not other Rs) and C 1 is typically des ignated as a two-term contingency. The behavior identified as RI is shown to occur several times. Only one other be havior occurs more than once (R2), and it occurs only twice. Within the 1 min period of observation, RI can be seen to occur with increasing frequen cy and by the end of the minute, R 1 predominates in Person P's behavior stream.
Assume that RI has rarely, if ever, occurred previously in Person P's be havior stream. The schematic repre sents the acquisition of an operant we have labeled Operant X (in this case a "block-stacking" operant). The reli able temporal relation between RI and C I (together with the absence of such a temporal relation between other Rs and C I) is the contingency that is caus ing an increase in the frequency with which R I occurs in Person P's behav ior stream in a stable environment.
Recall the principle "behavior is a function of its consequences." The particular behavior that is a function of consequences in this example is Op erant X (a lineage of RI responses).
The "it" that is followed by a conse quence is occurrences of Rl (each stacking response). The temporal (and usually causal) relation between occur rences of Rl and occurrences of Cl has generated a lineage of RI that we have labeled X. Both the lineage (the child's block-stacking operant) and the indi vidual responses (each instance of stacking) are behavior-specifically, the behavior of Person P. But they are two different kinds of things. More over, the principle itself is content free and refers to any and all lineages, and their component responses, that have been generated by contingencies be tween responses and consequences. The value of the principle as a scien tific generality depends on the variety of the content that fits the formula and the variety of organisms whose behav ior can be predicted, changed, or use fully interpreted in terms of the prin ciple.
The I-min slice of a behavior stream portrayed in Figure 1 shows a stable situation that is present when all the responses occur, and it shows a certain kind of environmental change follow ing some of the responses. Changing the situation to S2 during the next min ute and ensuring that no responses are followed by C I in Situation S2 can add a level of complexity. Let us say that in Situation S2, the surface on which the blocks rest is not flat. Alternation of S 1 and S2 at varying intervals, with CI occurring after Rl only in Sl, typ ically results in high frequencies of R 1 in S I and low frequencies of RI in S2. The relation among SI-RI-Cl is then specified as a three-term contingency. In this case, the particulars of the three term contingency are "on flat surfaces (but not on sloping surfaces), placing blocks squarely on top of one another results in towers."
In a more dynamic and complete portrayal of a behavior stream, ele ments of the situation are usually changing moment to moment and most responses would be followed by a stimulus change of some kind (cf. Ray, Upson, & Henderson, 1977 The actions that recur in operant lin eages change over time as the contin gencies of selection develop and change. One way the operant lineages change is that the component actions become more complex. For example, a child may learn to plug cords into wall sockets, and to turn dials such as on the kitchen timer, and to press hand kerchiefs when his dad has finished ironing his shirt. In a situation calling for a pressed shirt, variations of the three responses may occur in a novel sequence, resulting in a pressed shirt. This coming together of responses from operant lineages learned at dif ferent times has been termed contin gency coadduction (Layng & Andron is, 1984) . The relation between the novel (adduced) response sequence and the environmental consequence may increase the likelihood of repeti tions of the sequence, eventually re sulting in a new operant lineage in the child's repertoire. Call it ironing. The ironing lineage is a recurring sequence of actions, each instance of the se quence composed of elements origi nally recruited from earlier acquired operant lineages. Because all the com ponents of the sequence are required in each occurrence to produce the conse quence, the sequence of components acquires a functional integrity of its own. The nesting or embedding of oc currences of one lineage in more com plex occurrences of another lineage is a highly consistent characteristic of hu man behavior. An example of such nesting is shown in Figure 2 . Note that the lineage is always composed of re curring events, and the increasing com plexity is seen in the increasing num ber of components in the occurrences of the hierarchical lineages.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTENT IN OPERANT CONTINGENCIES
The only necessary feature of the environmental events in three-term contingencies is that they be empirical events. pirical events in myriad ways: visual or auditory, temporally extended or punc tate, verbal or nonverbal, social or non social, and so on. Any single event can be categorized in many different ways. Lightning as an event in one's environ ment is visual, punctate, nonverbal, and nonsocial. In a child's environ ment, my humming a tune can be cat egorized as auditory, extended, non verbal, and social. Another way that empirical events can be categorized is in terms of their temporal relation to the hehavior of a learner or performer. The lightning may be a situation (an tecedent) in which the behavior of ask ing "lightning'?" results in the conse quence of "yes." My humming may be the situation in which the child's humming results in the sound of our duet (consequence). Whether the "yes" or the sound of the duct func tions like C 1 in Figure 1 is an empiri cal question. If they do, we consider them as belonging to yet another cat egory: reinforcer.
The social environment is defined, for present purposes, as the behavior of other people as it relates to the behav ior of a learner or performer. Your question "What is your name?" is part of my social environment. My answer ing with my name is a social event in your environment. For any particular occurrence of an operant response, the situation may involve social and non social events. One or more conse quences also may be either social or nonsocial. Figure 3 uation and reinforcing consequence in operant contingencies. Environmental events are italicized, and boldface identifies social events. The everyday distinction between social and nonsocial events has en couraged some authors to distinguish between "social learning" and "indi vidual learning," the implication being that they involve different learning processes (e.g., Box, 1984) . But such implication is not warranted because it confuses process and content. All learning is individual learning (Galef, 1988) ; that is, the locus of learning comprises the events in the behavior stream of an individual organism as they relate to environmental events. The social character of some or all en vironmental events in behavioral con tingencies distinguishes the content of the environment, not the process by which that environment affects behav ior. The behavioral processes are the same, whether the environment that functions to select the behavior is so cial or nonsocial, and those processes are a biological given.
The social content in the contingen cies that support most of the learning accomplished by humans is a defining feature of human cultures. Although rudimentary cultures are seen in other species (Bonner, 1980; Harris, 1989) , only humans depend almost entirely on cultural transmission of behavioral content for the survival of their spe cies. How could natural selection have lost so much direct control over the survival of one of its creations? And what genetically transmitted human characteristics lengthened the leash of natural selection so dramatically?
BIOLOGICAL INHERITANCE AND CULTURE
In addition to a distinct combination of anatomical and physiological char acteristics-such as opposable thumbs, bipedal locomotion, acute hearing and vision, a highly plastic brain, and an intricate and flexible vocal apparatus the human species has several geneti cally transmitted behavioral character istics that appear to have underpinned the emergence of culture. The first be havioral characteristic that made hu man cultures possible is their sociali ty-the strong tendency of humans to spend most of their time in close prox imity to one another. Without this ten dency, there would be little possibility for social events (i.e., the behavior of conspecifics) to serve as environmental events having function with respect to human behavior.
Skinner (l984b) identified two other behavioral characteristics that together constitute what may be called, some what vaguely, "learning potential." First, humans are born with a reper toire of "uncommitted behavior," which distinguishes them from social species such as ants, whose specific be havior-environment interactions are highly constrained by inheritance. Whereas ants, for example, inherit spe cific behavioral patterns in response to specific social events, human behavior becomes related to any of a wide va riety of environmental events, depend ing on the particulars of the social and nonsocial environment in which the human lives. To be sure, human action is constrained by human biology; but in each generation, humans have to learn all over again what their ances tors learned-a laborious process in deed, but one that allows the behavior of each generation to become adapted to current environmental events. And those environmental events can change from generation to generation and have done so at a steadily increasing pace.
By outfitting humans with a largely uncommitted behavioral repertoire, natural selection gave our species a long leash for local behavioral adap tations. But the uncommitted repertoire of humans would be lethal without the second characteristic of human learn ing potential-the susceptibility of hu man behavior to operant selection. Al though this behavioral characteristic is shared by many species, humans ap pear to be most exquisitely sensitive to behavioral contingencies of selection (Schwartz, 1974) . This characteristic does not depend on whether the envi ronmental events in the behavioral se lection contingencies are social or non social, but the preponderance of social events in the behavioral contingencies all but guarantees the emergence of cui tural phenomena.
EMERGENCE OF
CULTURAL PHENOMENA
The combination in humans of learning potential and sociality set the stage for the emergence of culture-a novel kind of phenomenon. Like the word behavior, culture is a mass noun, a category word, and also a word that refers to the particulars that are mem bers of that category (specific cul tures). As a category of phenomena, we will define culture here as "patterns of learned behavior transmitted social ly, as well as the products of that be havior (objects, technologies, organi zations, etc.)."
Culture begins with the transmission of behavioral content, learned by one organism during its lifetime, to the rep ertoires of other organisms. Thus, the locus of cultural phenomena is su praorganismic. Unlike learning, which is localized in repeated temporal rela tions between the actions of a single organism and other empirical events, the locus of cultural things is supraor ganismic because it involves repeti tions of the interrelated behavior of two or more organisms; one organism's behavior functions as the situation or consequences in the operant contingen cies accounting for the behavior of the other. Such transmission requires no new biological trait or behavioral pro cess, but it does initiate a new kind of lineage: a culturo-behavioral lineage (Glenn, 2003) .
Culturo-behavioral lineages extend deeply into human history, and they also occur in rudimentary form among nonhuman species (Kawamura, 1959) . A curious fact about human cultures is that after anatomically modern humans spent tens of thousands of years in ru dimentary cultures, human cultures be came quite complex in little more than 10,000 years-an extraordinarily short period of evolutionary time (Harris, 1989) . This suggests that long before cultural takeoff, humans had the ana tomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics (delineated above) that they needed for the emergence and evolution of complex cultures. Missing were the changes in environmental events (social and material) that could enter into operant contingencies across generations, supporting individual be havior that differed from generation to generation.
Cultural Practices and Macrocontingencies
Much of the behavioral content of individual human repertoires is similar to the content of many other humans. The term cultural practices refers to similar patterns of behavioral content, usually resulting from similarities in environments. The term metabehavior has been suggested to identify the class of behaviors that constitute a cultural practice (Mawhinney, 1995) . The need for a term subsuming a supraorganis mic class of behaviors is recognized, but we will use the term macrobehav ior here because it is consistent with the other terminology in this paper.
Cultural practices may be important or unimportant for the survival of a culture. An example of a practice not likely to be critical for cultural survival is hairstyling. Many hairdressers may style hair similarly, and this similarity of behavioral content constitutes a cul tural practice. Important to note is that such similarity does not imply that the practice is a functional cultural unit. In other words, the behavior of the vari uus hairdressers is not necessarily functionally related to the behavior of any other hairdressers. Individual hair dressers simply may learn over time to cut certain types of hair in certain ways as a result of the consequent look of the product and approval of their pa trons. The resulting products (hair styles) consequently look alike. Nei ther the hairstyles nor the behavior of the hairdressers are functionally related to one another, even though the behav ior of each hairdresser interrelates with the behavior of each of his or her pa trons. In this case, the similar behavior of many individuals constitutes a cul tural practice, but there is no evidence of cultural transmission and, therefore, no culturo-behavioral lineage exists.
On the other hand, there may be a point of cultural transmission that links the behavior of two or more hairdress ers. For example, Hairdresser A may demonstrate to other hairdressers a way to style hair, and the others may reproduce the style under the watchful eye of the originator and later with their own patrons. If the hair styled by A is featured in a magazine or seen on customers by other hairdressers, some of them may be able to produce a sim ilar result for their own patrons. These cases involve cultural transmission. Any cultural practice may be made lip of independently generated behaviors and also socially transmitted behaviors. The point of these two examples is that similarity in behavioral content of many individuals is sufficient to con sider the aggregate behavior a cultural practice, but is not sufficient to assume cultural transmission, and is even less sufficient to assume a common origin.
Another way of distinguishing among cultural practices is in terms of the complexity of the behavioral con tent that constitutes the practice. The macrobehavior that constitutes a spe cific cultural practice may be straight forwardly identifiable operants such as smoking cigarettes; or multioperant patterns of behavior such as styling hair, driving to work, or recycling; or very complex patterns of interlocking behavior of many individuals, such as that involved in auto manufacturing. Whether comprising simple ur com plex elements, cultural practices all have two characteristics that are im portant for the present discussion. First, they involve many people en gaged in the same repeated actions (be having individually or in relation to one another) and, second, those actions have consequences-often several dif ferent consequences.
Consider the behavior of driving to work. A consequence essential to its continuing repetition in an individual's behavior stream is arrival at work. But in most cases, there are other behaviors that could result in arriving at work (e.g., carpooling, using mass transpor tation, bicycling, or walking). The fact that most people drive to work rather than getting there some other way sug gests that additional consequences are involved and that they differ for dif ferent behaviors. Figure 4 shows some likely consequences of driving to work versus carpooling.
Note that all of the consequences shown in italics depend only on the be havior of the individual worker, and they are experienced within a short time after the behavior occurs. Al though the worker does not control the cost of gasoline, he or she does have control over whether more or less of his or her paycheck goes for gasoline, and whether he or she takes more or less time, with more or less conve nience, in getting to work. Because of the correlation between the behavior and those consequences, those conse quences have some potential to in crease or decrease the relative proba bilities of driving or carpooling. When multiple consequences have conflicting functions, the overall effect of the con sequences may be the algebraic sum mation of their individual effects (see Skinner, 1953, pp. 218-223) . And the effect of each of these consequences is relative. For example, if a worker who drove to work was transferred to a work site much farther from home, the change in relative value of gasoline cost versus convenience might make carpooling more likely than before, es pecially because the time involved in carpooling versus driving might not differ much for the longer drive. The effect of our worker's behavior on air pollution, shown in boldface in Figure 4 , is a very different kind of consequence. It is not only a matter of the consequence being too small, too delayed, or too cumulative for it to have a hehavioral function, although all of that is true and important (see R.
W. Malott & Suarez, 2004) . There is something else that sets apart the effect on air pollution from the other effects of the two behaviors. To wit, even if, by some magic, we were able to give this consequence a powerful function, the consequence itself can be nullified by the behavior of other people. Our worker, mightily motivated to have cleaner air, can carpool for the next 20 or 30 years, but if a lot of other people do not do the same thing, the air is not going to be any cleaner. In other words, cleaner air is simply not under our worker's control. That is, as Hardin (1968) succinctly put the matter, the tragedy of the commons. No matter how much one behaves for the com mon good, the behavior of others can undo it all. That is the critical differ ence between the italicized and bold faced consequences listed in Figure 4 . Ulman (1998, p. 209) the cumulative effects of those differ ing actions. As mentioned above, how ever, the cumulative effects cannot be in a contingent relation with the behav ior of any individual; therefore they cannot control (as operant consequenc es) the behavior of individuals. And al though there may be a contingent re lation between the sum of the topog raphies and the cumulative effect, the summed topographies are not part of a lineage that can wax or wane together as a function of the postcedent. If the postcedent has any effect at all on any operant lineages of individual people, that effect is independent of any effect it may have on operant lineages of oth er people." " Macrocontingencies as here defined can in volve different topographies of different people, That being said, the notion of some kind of relation that is bigger than op erant contingencies seems useful. So I will define a macrocontingency as the relation between a cultural practice and the aggregate sum of consequences of the macrobehavior constituting the practice. Figure 5 shows the relations in a macrocontingency as here defined. The recurring behavior of each person has its own effects, and the relation be tween the behavior and that effect can alter the probability of the recurrence of that individual's behavior (as in Fig  ure 1 ). For example, if the behavior is driving to work, then each person's driving-to-work operant is a function of the contingency between driving to work and the operant consequences of that behavior. In addition to those in di viduated consequences, the com bined behavior of all the people (the macrobehavior) has a cumulative ef fect. This effect cannot function as a behavioral consequence because it is not contingent on the behavior of any individual driver. It is contingent on the macrobehavior of the cultural prac tice.
An important feature of macrocon tingencies is that their cumulative ef fects are additive. The more wide spread a practice, the greater its cu mulative effects; the greater the cu mulative effects, the more important they are to the well-being of large numbers of people. Each person con tributing to the cumulative effect con tributes in direct proportion to the fre quency of his or her behavior. It is the cumulative effect of the behavior in a cultural practice that constitutes a problem for the people of a culture. To continue with the example, the driving behavior of each individual is as it is because of the relative effects of its multiple behavioral consequences: ar riving at work in good time with min imum difficulty and the money spent on gasoline. These consequences that maintain the driving behavior contrib ute to the probability of driving, but they are not the culturally relevant cu mulative effects: gasoline consumption and associated environmental effects. Further, the behavior is not a problem for the individuals behaving-rather it is a solution, albeit not an ideal solu tion, to the problem posed by their dis tance from work. As in the case of the behavior of individuals, cultural prac tices also have multiple consequences.
For example, two effects of consumer behavior are that it helps to create jobs and it contributes to degradation of the physical environment. Such incompat ible effects of cultural practices are even more difficult to reconcile than similar incompatible effects of individ ual behavior. That is because the mul tiple cumulative effects of any given cultural practice are likely to be more advantageous to some people and more disadvantageous to others. In the case of individual behavior, at least the costs and benefits affect the same person.
Discussion of macrocontingencies has centered on the cumulative effect of many people "doing the same thing" (allowing for a broad range of topographies). The people could be acting individually (e.g., smoking), or their behavior could be interrelated (e.g., carpooling). Either way, the sim ilarity in operant content of many peo ple is what warrants our calling it a cultural practice. Each time the behav ior occurs, it adds to the cumulative ef fect. So the cumulative effect depends on the number of times the act occurs, and that number is a function of the number of people who engage in the act and the frequency of the behavior of each person.
The relation between any particular cultural practice and its cumulative ef fect may be critically important to the welfare of the people of the culture, and even to the survival of that culture. But a cultural practice (as here defined and as generally, albeit vaguely, un derstood) cannot participate in a selec tion process. That is so because a cul tural practice is a class of acts that are functionally independent of one anoth er. In other words, recurrences of the acts do not participate in a lineage. They are classified as "the same" in terms of their form and their effects, but the members of the class are not necessarily related by descent, which is a defining feature of evolution by se lection (Hull, Langman, & Glenn, 2001) . In short, a cultural practice does not evolve as a result of cultural selec tion, but rather as a result of behavioral contingencies of selection operating on the behavior of many individuals; as a result, a different cultural practice comes to exist. For example, the cul tural practice of smoking in public buildings has been replaced in many areas by a practice of going outside public buildings to smoke. The change in the cultural practice is a behavior change of many individuals, each re sponsive to his or her own social en vironment. When there is change in the practices that constitute a culture, the change is an emergent side effect of concurrent changes in behavioral line ages of many individuals. The causal mechanism is behavioral selection (i.e., the principle of reinforcement).
If certain human cultural practices, or their cumulative outcomes, threaten the safety of the world, then saving the world will necessarily entail altering the operant contingencies that maintain the behavioral lineages that contribute to those outcomes. Such action re quires interpretation of complex phe nomena in the language of the experi mental analysis of behavior (see Palm er, 1991) . Cultural change will be dif ficult to accomplish, as Skinner (1987) suggested, when the verbal practices of those cultures do not include the lan guage of the experimental analysis of behavior. On the positive side, when that language does guide action de signed to bring about changes in rna crobehavior, those actions can be quite successful.
What about Skinner's (1987) sug gestion that the experimental analysis of behavior would support a theory of cultural evolution in the same way that Darwin's theory of biological evolu tion is supported by the experimental science of genetics? This suggestion needs a great deal of clarification be cause the relations between genes and the species that carry them are ex tremely complex, as are the scientific fields of evolutionary biology and ex perimental genetics. Perhaps most im portant to the present discussion is the increasing complexity (of organisms' structure and function as well as eco logical relations among them) that has characterized the evolution of organic phenomena. It appears that human cul tures, too, have been characterized by organizational structures and functions that have become increasingly com plex throughout human history. The concept of metacontingencies may help us to understand how that com plexity evolved.
METACONTINGENCIES
A clear distinction between the con cepts of metacontingencies and macro contingencies is needed, because early papers introducing the concept of me tacontingencies (Glenn, 1986 (Glenn, , 1988 combined terminology suitable for dis cussion of macrocontingencies (as here defined) and metacontingencies (as here defined). The prefix meta-togeth er with the root contingencies is in tended to suggest selection contingen cies that are hierarchically related to, and subsume, behavioral contingen cies. They represent "a different kind of selection," although "no new be havioral process" is involved (Skinner, 1984a, p. 504) . Metacontingencies are not a matter of an enlarged class of be havior or more widespread behavioral contingencies; rather, they are the en gine of a different kind of selection. The metacontingencies of cultural se lection emerged only after social events become prevalent in the behav ioral environment of a species that has the human combination of physical and behavioral traits.
The concept of metacontingencics addresses evolution by selection when the lineages that evolve are not the re curring acts of individuals (as sche matized in Figure 1 ), but rather are re curring interlocking behavioral contin gencies (IBCs) that function as an in tegrated unit and result in an outcome that affects the probability of future re currences of the mcs. Figure 6 is a schematic of the metacontingencies of cultural selection as it goes on in time. The recurring IBCs comprise operant contingencies in which the behavior of two or more people functions as envi ronmental events for the behavior of the others. The outcomes produced by recurrences of the IECs are not the cu Extended Time PerSOllS P 1 and P2 Metacontingencies, then, are the contingencies of cultural selection. They give rise to the organized collec tions of behavioral contingencies that constitute increasingly complex cultur al-level entities. Let us continue with the example of the relation between Todd's and Marta's IBCs and the re sulting meals. Variations in the features of the IBCs will result in variations in the outcome, and if the difference in outcomes perpetuates some patterns of the IBCs more than others, cultural level selection has occurred. Note that Todd's behavior is a function of behav ioral contingencies that might include the taste of the meals cooked, and Mar ta's behavior is a function of other be havioral contingencies that might in clude the taste of the meals cooked.
Those behavioral contingencies are necessary for the continuation and evo lution of Todd's and Marta's operants, and thus of the IECs; but they are not necessarily sufficient for the IBCs. The outcome of the lBCs must be more than or different than the meals that ei ther Todd or Marta could produce by themselves to maintain the recurrences of the IBCs. It is this "more than" or "different than" that is the source of cultural evolution and what distin guishes it from behavioral evolution.
CULTURAL COMPLEXITY
Cultural complexity is the outcome of cultural selection that results in nest ed hierarchies of IBCs (Glenn & Mal ott, in press). For example, Todd and Marta may open a restaurant where cooking meals is part of a larger pat tern of recurring IBCs. Figure 7 shows a nesting of IBC relations in increas ingly complex cultural lineages. Whether the larger pattern continues to recur and evolve depends on the out comes of cooking but also on the out comes of other IBCs in the situation. The behavior of other people may be come part of the larger pattern and contribute substantially to the outcome that maintains the continuing recur rences of the mc that constitute "the business." Finally, although the IBCs must continue to recur for the cultural lineage to remain in existence, it is not necessary that Todd's or Marta's be havior continues to participate. The be havior of other individuals can replace one or both of theirs as long as that behavior fits well enough into the IBCs to produce the outcome. Perhaps it is worth noting that such replacement of one participant's behavior for another's in a cultural lineage virtually always causes some adjustments in the IBCs and thus always presents both oppor tunity and threat to the continuing sur vival of the lineage. Like the responses in operant contin gencies, the IBCs in metacontingencies can result in both automatic outcomes and socially mediated outcomes that depend on the features of the automatic outcome. For example, Todd's and Marta's IBCs at first had automatic outcomes-meals-that differentially perpetuated some variations of the IBCs. Eventually, the IBes constitut ing their restaurant were maintained by the ordering behavior of customers. As in the case of social reinforcers for in dividual behavior, the socially mediat ed relation between the IBCs of the restaurant and the sustaining income generated from customer purchases provides a foundation for more com plex relations.
The nested metacontingencies of cultural selection are the basis for the evolution of cultural complexity as well as the maintenance (survival) of evolving organizational lineages. Just as components of one operant lineage become embedded in operant lineages of more complex components (as in Figure 2 ), components of one lineage of IBCs can become embedded in IBCs of greater complexity (as in Fig  ure 7 ). The relation between IRCs and their outcomes has functional parallels to the complex relations of behavioral contingencies. The IBCs produce out comes, variations in instantiations of IBCs cause differential outcomes, and the future frequency of the IBCs as well as their characteristics are a func tion of the differential relation between instantiations and outcomes. Changes endogenous or exogenous to the IBCs may result in a variation that produces a different outcome, and that outcome can increase or decrease the probability of recurrences of the IBCs.
ENGINEERING CHANGE
Humans have been engaged in be havioral engineering since they began functioning as the environment in the operant contingencies that support the behavior of other humans. Only in the 20th century of the current era, how ever, has scientific understanding been brought to bear on these engineering practices. Cultural engineering has not yet found sure scientific footing. A necessary first step is to understand the phenomena to be engineered. From the present perspective, engineering can occur with respect to two kinds of phe nomena: macrobehavior and metacon tingencies.
The macro behavior of cultural prac tices can be identified as a problem only when its cumulative effects are recognized, and it often takes a long time to gain understanding of the many effects of specific cultural practices. The only way to do something about the cumulative effects of macrobehav ior is to find ways to alter the behavior of as many individual participants as possible. For example, the more indi viduals who carpool or take public transportation to work rather than drive alone, the greater is the improvement in air quality (or the slower the wors ening of air quality). When the number of participants in a practice is large, a change in the behavior of a small per centage of them can make an important difference. If 10% of the drivers in the U.S. carpooled with two other people, a noticeable reduction in air pollution might result. What could bring about such a change in the behavior of 10% of drivers? Considering that each driv er's behavior is a function of the op erant contingencies in effect, we must consider the consequences of the be havior of driving to work versus the consequences of carpooling, as dis cussed previously and shown in Figure  4 . The assumption is made, for pur poses of discussion, that the effects of the behaviors listed in Figure 4 could function as behavioral consequences, with the exception of the effect on air pollution.
As matters now stand, attempts by society to engender alternative macro behaviors are implemented with little understanding of the potential cumu lative effects (Nevin, 1998) , and little attention is paid to the many operant contingencies that may be maintaining the operant behavior of individual par ticipants in the current practice. Be cause the macrobehavior of cultural practices is a function of operant con tingencies that operate independently, but concurrently and similarly, on the behavior of many people, behavior an alysts have rightly called for analysis of the contingencies that maintain the behavior that constitutes the practice. Mattaini (1995) , in particular, has ar gued that behavior analysts should be trained specifically to focus on behav ior with cumulative effects that affect the viability of the culture. When in terventions are designed to alter the cu mulati ve effect of a cultural practice, they must necessarily identify the op erant contingencies that account for the behavior of individuals who participate in the practice. The more individuals whose behavior changes, the greater is the impact on the cumulative effect. This method of cultural intervention entails modifying the operant contin gencies that are likely to maintain the behavior of large numbers of people. Biglan (1995) Because much of the operant behav ior of modern humans is embedded in organizations that have recurring IBCs, survival of those organizations is, at the very least, important to those hu mans. The fact that the organizations exist at all, however, suggests that their IBCs were selected by their external environment and, therefore, are an im portant part of the larger culture, whether or not alternative organiza tional structures are considered more desirable. Engineering, then, can also occur with respect to the IBCs in me tacontingencies. .
IBCs can be Changed in two ways that are analogous to the two ways that species characteristics can be altered. The first is by altering the external se lecting environment and waiting for variations in the IBCs to produce out comes suitable to the new selection contingencies. This amounts to altering the contingencies of selection and let ting the chips fall where they may. The second way is similar to ascertaining and altering the genetic characteristics that are endangering a species' exis tence given the current selecting envi ronment. This tactic entails altering the components of the IBCs so that they are better adapted to the current se lecting environment. Planned varia tions of the recurring IBCs can be de signed to produce outcomes more suit able to the demands of the external en vironment.
Engineering change to enhance the survival of organizations (recurring ar rangements of IBCs) requires analyses of current metacontingencies and also analyses of the specific behavioral con tingencies that affect the outcome of IBCs. It should be obvious that all of the IBCs and the operant contingencies in complex organizations cannot be an alyzed. There must be some way to distinguish between those that can be ignored and those that must be ad dressed. M. E. Malott (2003) described an approach to organizational change that combines a behavioral systems en gineering model with metacontingency analysis. Her collaborations with the personnel in business organizations as well as in at least one institution of higher education (M. E. Malott & Sa las-Martinez, 2004 ) demonstrate the importance-indeed, the necessity-of isolating the IBCs that fail to meet se lection contingencies and then identi fying the operant behavior that must be altered to bring about the kind of changes in lBCs required by the exter nal environment.
In summary, to bring about changes in the organized IBCs that function as evolving cultural units, it is necessary to identify the lBCs that contribute to an outcome and to identify the function of the outcome in sustaining (or not) recurrences of the mc. Variations can be made in the lECs by systematically manipulating the behavioral contingen cies within them, and the variations may increase or decrease the probabil ity of producing an outcome with a sustaining function.
RELATION OF METACONTINGENCIES TO OPERANT CONTINGENCIES AND MACROCONTINGENCIES
Metacontingencies, like behavioral contingencies, involve two kinds of causality, as can be seen by comparing Figures I and 3 . First, the recurrences of IBCs produce outcomes (analogous to consequences produced by recur rences of operant responses). Second, the outcomes affect the future frequen cy and other measures of the future re currences of those IBCs. The contin gencies of selection in metacontingen cies are between cultural-level units (mCs) and their selecting environ ments. Evolving cultural units are re curring cycles of mcs. Like operants in a repertoire, the recurring entities may become part of increasingly com plex entities that form a lineage of their own (see Figure 7) . The outcomes pro duced by a cycle of IBCs can affect future cycles of IBCs, just as the con sequences of a behavioral occurrence can affect future occurrences of that behavior. If one is interested in altering the recurrences of IBCs, one can do so by altering the components of IBCs to better meet current selection require ments or by altering the selecting en vironment. The former strategy would be comparable to genetic alteration and the latter to artificial selection.
The IBCs in metacontingcncies, like the individual behavior in operant con tingencies, recur in lineages that evolve and change as a function of their se lecting environments. They are also alike in their relation to macrocontin gencies. Just as the similar operant be haviors of many people can contribute to a cumulative outcome, the lECs of several different organizations may also contribute to a cumulative out come, as shown in Figure 8 . The be havioral lineages of the different peo ple who participate in a cultural prac tice evolve independently, as do the IBC lineages of the different organi zations. But both the behaviors and the IBCs may also contribute to a cumu lative outcome that plays no direct role in selection but nevertheless may be important indicators of the viability of the culture. The organizations in Figure 8 could be programs comprising lECs that pro duce graduates trained as behavior an alysts. Each program produces gradu ates (among other things) whose per formance contributes directly and in directly to the selection of the recurring IBCs that produce cohort after cohort of graduates. The IBCs that produce behavior analysis graduates constitute a cultural practice and they have cu mulative effects, including the number of people prepared for academic ap pointments, the number of individuals who can be served by professional be havior analysts, the amount of federal funding likely to go to behavior-ana lytic researchers, and so on. Although individual behavior analysts and the program faculty of individual programs can be moved to action by data on the cumulative effects of the summed be havior or summed IBCs, those effects cannot select any of the individual op erant lineages or the individual line ages of IBCs, because there is no lin eage of recurring entities that produces those effects. If one is interested in al tering the cumulati ve outcomes of a cultural practice, one must find a way to alter the behavioral contingencies of macrobehaviors or the metacontingen cies supporting the IBCs of organized cultural complexity. The more individ ual contingencies or organizational metacontingencies that are altered, the greater the potential change in the cu mulative outcome.
The larger the number of organiza tions characterized by the same kinds of IBCs, the more likely we are to con sider those kinds of IBCs a cultural practice. Statements such as "the cul tural practices of Japanese businesses are different from the cultural practices of American businesses" refer to sim ilarities in the IECs that characterize American companies and similarities in the IDCs that characterize Japanese companies, as well as the differences between the American and the Japa nese companies.
CONCLUSION
The distinctions made herein among behavioral contingencies, macrocontin gencies, and metacontingencies repre sent an attempt to clarify the complex ways that selection works with respect to the behavior of individual humans and to organizations of IDCs in which much human behavior is embedded. Cultural practices per se cannot evolve. The constituent members of cultural practices do evolve, however, whether they are the operants of individuals or the IBCs of organizational entities with a life of their own, above and beyond the behavior of the particular people who participate in them.
Because cultures are human con structions, and their increasing com plexity arises from the increasing com plexity of the entities that participate in metacontingenices, it seems highly likely that humans can alter at least some elements of their cultures. Unless we understand how cultures arise and evolve, however, it will be difficult to make wise choices regarding what can be changed or should be changed.
